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Background 
On December 30th 2019, the People’s Republic of China 
reported a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases occurred 
in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province. A novel corona-
virus, initially termed as 2019-nCov and later named as 
“Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus type 
2” (SARS-CoV-2), was identified as the infectious agent 
responsible for the “coronavirus disease 2019” (CO-
VID-19), a generally mild but occasionally severe and 
life-threatening infection  [1, 2]. On January 13th 2020, 
public health officials confirmed a COVID-19 case in 
Thailand, the first case recorded outside mainland Chi-
na  [3], pointing at the global, quick spread of the vi-
rus, despite initial allegations that the human-to-human 
transmission potential of the coronavirus was limited. 
As of January 30th 2020, the “World Health Organization” 
(WHO) characterized the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak 
as a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” 
(PHEIC) and later, on March 11th 2020, as a global pan-
demic [4, 5]. As of April 13th, over 1,800,000 confirmed and 
410,000 recovered cases have been reported, as well as over 
100,000 deaths, in more than 210 countries and territories, 
including developed and developing settings. Data from 
mainland China shows that up to 15-20% of COVID-19 
cases need hospitalization, with approximately 15% of 
them being severe and 5% requiring intensive care [6]. The 
spread of the virus has strained and overwhelmed the pub-
lic health capacity of healthcare systems worldwide [7, 8], 
challenging their resilience [9, 10]. 
The role of health systems in the management of Emerg-
ing and reemerging infections like outbreaks and pan-
Background. The role of health systems in the management of 
disasters, including natural hazards like outbreaks and pandem-
ics, is crucial and vital. Healthcare systems which are unprepared 
to properly deal with crises are much more likely to expose their 
public health workers and health personnel to harm and will not 
be able to deliver healthcare provisions in critical situations. This 
can lead to a drammatic toll of deaths, even in developed coun-
tries. The possible occurrence of global crises has prompted the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to devise instruments, guide-
lines and tools to assess the capacity of countries to deal with dis-
asters. Iran’s health system has been hit hardly by the COVID-19 
pandemic. In this study, we aimed to assess its preparedness and 
response to the outbreak.
Methods. The present investigation was designed as a qualita-
tive study. We utilized the “COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and 
Response Plan” devised by WHO as a conceptual framework.
Results. The dimension/pillar which scored the highest 
was national laboratories, followed by surveillance, rapid 
response teams and case investigations. Risk communication 
and community engagement was another pillar receiving a 
high score, followed by infection prevention and control and 
by country-level coordination, planning and monitoring. The 
pillars/dimensions receiving the lowest scores were opera-
tional support and logistics; case management; and points 
of entry.
Discussion. The COVID-19 pandemic has represented an unprec-
edent event that has challenged healthcare systems and facilities 
worldwide, highlighting their weaknesses and the need for inter-
sectoral cooperation and collaboration during the crisis. Analyz-
ing these experiences and capitalizing on them, by strengthening 
them,will help countries to be more prepared to face possible 
future crises.
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demics, such as the “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome” 
(MERS) and the “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” 
(SARS), is crucial and vital, and their resilience can be 
defined as “the capacity of health actors, institutions, 
and populations to prepare for and effectively respond to 
crises; maintain core functions when a crisis hits; and, 
informed by lessons learned during the crisis, reorga-
nize if conditions require it”  [11]. Healthcare systems 
which are unprepared to properly deal with crises are 
much more likely to expose their health care workers to 
harm [12, 13]. Furthermore, unprepared health systems 
will not be able to deliver healthcare provisions in criti-
cal situations, and this can lead to a drammatic toll of 
deaths, even in developed countries [14-16]. 
The possible occurrence of global crises has prompted 
the WHO to devise instruments, guidelines and tools to 
assess the capacity of countries to deal with disasters. 
These include the “International Health Regulations” 
(IHR) “Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the 
Global Health Security Agenda country assessment” 
and its consolidated version “Joint External Evaluation” 
(JEE) [17, 18]. In more detail, these tools enable to mea-
sure country public health capacity to prevent, detect, 
and rapidly respond to risks, whether occurring naturally 
or due to deliberate or accidental events.
On February 19th 2020, Iran has reported its first confirmed 
COVID-19 case  [19]. As of April 13th 2020, more than 
73,000 people have been infected, 45,000 have recovered, 
and more than 4,500 have died [20]. Currently, 981 hos-
pitals with more than 130,000 beds are providing health 
services to over 80 million people. The ongoing outbreak is 
responsible for 79.2% of all deaths and 74% (71.5-76.4%) 
of the burden of disease attributable to non communicable 
disorders. Iran’s health system has been hit hardly by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, we aimed to assess its 
preparedness and response to the outbreak.
Methods 
The present investigation was designed as a qualitative 
study. We utilized the “COVID-19 Strategic Prepared-
ness and Response Plan” devised by WHO as a concep-
tual framework.
Conceptual framework
The “COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response 
Plan” consists of eight dimensions/pillars to measure the 
capacity of countries’ health systems to respond to the 
COVID-19 pandemic  [21]. These are: 1) country-level 
coordination, planning, and monitoring (12  actions); 
2)  risk communication and community engagement 
(11 actions); 3)  surveillance, rapid response teams, and 
case investigation (10 actions); 4) points of entry (5 ac-
tions); 5) national laboratories (10 actions); 6) infection 
prevention and control (IPC) (13 actions); 7) case man-
agement (11 actions); and, finally, 8) operational support 
and logistics (6 actions). Each dimension/pillar has three 
steps indicating the set of actions that need to be taken 
and implemented by the national health system.
Data collection 
Data was collected through a purposeful content analy-
sis, based on the WHO’s tool and its related eight dimen-
sions/pillars. Relevant documents, including programs, 
reports, guidances, action plans, official statements of 
country’s officials, were retrieved by mining the official 
websites of the Ministry of Health and Medical Educa-




the Government (http://www.qavanin.ir/), Universities 
and hospitals. 
Data analysis
After collecting the relevant documents, these were 
analyzed and scored independently by two researchers, 
based on the above-mentioned Conceptual Framework. 
Three possible replies for each dimension/pillar were 
considered: “yes”, “no”, and “unclear”. The results of 
the two researchers were compared, and any disagree-
ment was discussed, until a consensus was reached. 
Furthermore, a committee of 20 experts, including pro-
vincial, national, and university policy- and decision-
makers was established to review and evaluate the scores 
assigned to each pillar/dimension. Cohen’s kappa coef-
ficient was used to assess the level of agreement. Once 
again, potential disagreement was resolved by discus-
sion until a consensus was achieved.
Results
The resilience, readiness and preparedness of Iran’s 
health system to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic has 
been evaluated based on the WHO’s “Strategic Prepar-
edness and Response Plan” items. Scores are pictorially 
reported in Figure 1 and Table  I. The dimension/pillar 
which scored the highest was national laboratories, fol-
lowed by surveillance, rapid response teams and case 
investigations. Risk communication and community 
engagement was another pillar receiving a high score, 
followed by infection prevention and control and by 
country-level coordination, planning and monitoring. 
The pillars/dimensions receiving the lowest scores were 
operational support and logistics; case management; and 
points of entry. The evaluation of the Iran’s health sys-
tem according to the COVID-19 strategic preparedness 
and response plan of the WHO is reported in Appendix. 
Discussion
The WHO has issued a checklist of operational plan-
ning documents to guide and inform in an evdence-based 
fashion the response and preparation of countries to the 
currently ongoing outbreak [22]. The purpose of this pro-
gram was to provide immediate support to governments 
to implement measures and interventions aimed at con-
taining and managing the pandemic  [23]. Furthermore, 
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the WHO has also set a series of field-visits around coun-
tries. For instance, Dr. Hamelmann, WHO’s Representa-
tive for Iran, has planned visits to this country from March 
2nd to March 12th 2020, to assess the extent of difficulties 
and challenges faced by the Iranian healthcare system and 
provide critical feedback on Iran’s response capacity.
Based on the experiences of the previous out-
breaks  [24,  25], including SARS and MERS, the Iran 
Ministry of Health has sought to provide the best response 
according to the country’s cultural, social and economic 
conditions [26]. In Iran, on March 28th 2020, the “COV-
ID-19 Epidemiology Committee” was established [27] to 
investigate the epidemiological situation, reviewing docu-
ments and facts, and predict the disease trend, by simu-
lating hypothetical scenarios under the implementation of 
different behavioral, non-pharmacological interventions 
(NPIs), including physical/social distancing, self-isola-
tion, quarantine and even lock-down [28]. 
Pillar 1: National laboratories
This dimension/pillar obtained the highest score based 
on the evaluation of the panel of researchers and experts. 
Before the first official COVID-19 case in Iran (February 
19th 2020), when the disease was confined within main-
land China, an early diagnosis of the disease was delayed 
due to the unknown characteristics of the infectious agent 
and the lack of specific diagnostic kits. In late January, the 
disease caused by the virus was apparently mild, circulat-
ing in several cities, and, since the first cases were asymp-
tomatic or had no specific symptoms, the Iranian health 
system could not promptly identify the virus at that time.
The first identified cases were reported on February 
19th 2020, when assays based on Real-Time Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR) were available, enabling to con-
firm the first two deaths occurred in the Qom province 
as attributable to the viral outbreak [29]. Earlier, the Pas-
teur Institute of Iran (as the National Reference Labora-
Tab. I. Evaluation of the preparedness of Iranian health system to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Items Yes (%) No (%) Unclear (%) Kappa 
Country-level coordination, planning, and monitoring 66.66 0 33.34 0.73
Risk communication and community engagement 72.72 9.1 18.18 0.68
Surveillance, rapid response teams, and case investigation 80 10 10 0.81
Points of entry 20 0 80 0.71
National laboratories 90 0 10 0.86
Infection prevention and control 69.23 0 30.77 0.68
Case management 45.45 18.19 36.36 0.79
Operational support and logistics 50 0 50 0.87
Total 65.38 6.42 28.20 0.76
Fig. 1. Iranian health system preparedness score in response to COVID-19 pandemic.
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tory – NRL – for COVID-19) had begun designing tech-
niques for the molecular detection of the virus, utilizing 
pan-coronavirus kits instead of COVID-19 specific di-
agnostic assays. Furthermore, initially there were few 
laboratories, with the only ad hoc COVID-19-related 
facilites being based in the capital (Tehran), in Qom and 
Arak, areas characterized by a high prevalence rate of 
COVID-19. Later, the network of COVID-19 dedicated 
laboratories across the country was strenghtened with 
the establishment of 126 laboratories (40 of which be-
longing to the private sector), to respond more quickly 
and effectively to the outbreak. 
The country’s testing capacity has reached the figure 
of about 10,000 daily tests, with the ambitious goal of 
delivering more than 20,000  tests per day  [30]. Iran’s 
testing capacity is low compared to developed countries. 
Creating a global rapid response network of diagnostic 
kits and medical supplies manufacturers will enable the 
Iranian healthcare system to be equipped more quickly 
and adequately during future health crises.
To strengthten the technological know-how of the Iranian 
manufacturers, the Pasteur Institute of Iran has invited 
more than 50 companies to produce kits, of which five have 
been approved, since production kits have to be compa-
rable to the WHO’s reference kits and have to be approved 
by the MoHME. All services provided by the laboratory 
network are delivered almost free of charge (being paid by 
the government and insurance companies) for COVID-19 
inpatients and outpatients, and sampling is done through 
hospital referrals from urban and rural primary healthcare 
(PHC) centers. Iran, along with the WHO and the Pasteur 
Institute’s global network, is seeking to sequence the ge-
nome of the coronavirus and its local mutations, collabo-
rating as well for good laboratory practices (GLPs). Al-
though the embargo and economic sanctions have affected 
Iran’s capacity to respond to health crises [31, 32], includ-
ing purchasing, transferring goods/materials, and cooper-
ating with other facilities abroad to expand laboratory ca-
pacity, the global laboratory network has rapidly improved 
its response and reaction to the pandemic.
Pillar 2: Surveillance, rapid response teams, 
and case investigation
According to the indicators of the “Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals” (SDGs), Iran is the third country in the 
Eastern Mediterranean region (EMRO) after Bahrain 
and Egypt in terms of the implementation of an elec-
tronic health system, capturing, for instance, birth and 
death rates  [33]. This electronic health system was fi-
nally fully established after the 2015 “Health Trans-
formation Plan” (HTP), with electronic accounts being 
available for more than ten millions of rural and urban 
citizens. In Iran, more than 100,000 health service pro-
viders are using the electronic health information system 
in more than 30,000 centers [34]. The deployment of an 
electronic health system was beneficial in dealing with 
the new virus and the related pandemic.
In the management of infectious diseases, especially 
those emerging/re-emerging, it is crucial to provide up-
to-date guidelines for physicians and service provid-
ers [35, 36] in order to implement adequate, evidence-
based diagnostic, protective, and therapeutic protocols. 
Initially, in Iran, assessing gaps in active case finding 
was not comprehensive, documented, and study-ori-
ented, but mainly based on feedback and single cases. 
Subsequently, the guidelines issued by the WHO and the 
“Centers for Disease Control and Prevention” (CDC) 
were translated immediately after the request of the 
“Coronavirus National Committee” and modified and 
adapted according to the country’s health system. 
The Ministry of Health monitored adherence to the pro-
tocols of all public and private health centers. Records 
of patients were extracted from the health information 
system and reviewed, and related interventions were de-
signed ad hoc as needed. Data related to clinical and de-
mographic indicators were updated regularly, and rapid 
response teams were established to identify and actively 
trace cases. Asymptomatic cases were initially not fol-
lowed-up and, in a second period, followed-up by phone. 
Outpatient cases without severe symptoms were tested 
rarely. Low testing capacity is, indeed, the major vari-
able negatively impacting disease surveillance. 
Pillar 3: Risk communication and community 
engagement
The “National risk-communication and community en-
gagement plan for COVID-19” in Iran was designed 
based on the national flu response program, with precise 
strategies and tasks for each ministriy as well as with 
the measures to control borders and various scenarios 
simulations.
Regarding the general population, in addition to the ba-
sic principles of prevention such as hands washing and 
observing safe distances, infected areas or areas with a 
high probability of infection were promptly identified. 
Social media and networks have constantly informed 
and updated the at-risk population.
Specific groups, such as the elderly, people with under-
lying co-morbidities, especially chronic diseases, and 
high-risk workers, including medical staff, received 
special messages from the Ministry of Health and were 
monitored by phone.
Famous individuals (actors, religious leaders, and celeb-
rities), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and 
social activists  [37] provided COVID-19 related mes-
sages to the community, as well as television and radio 
programs broadcasted non-scientific, popular interven-
tions to increase awareness about the infection. 
Pillar 4: Infection prevention and control
Ensuring staff safety during an emergency is crucial 
for maintaining the capacity of a country’s health sys-
tem [38, 39]. With the spread of the disease to all prov-
inces of Iran, the country’s health system faced the chal-
lenge of a lack of front-line health workers. Infection 
prevention and control (IPC)-related capacity at all lev-
els of the healthcare system, including public and private 
sectors, and pharmacies at the national and provincial 
levels, is constantly updated by monitoring indicators 
such as the number of intensive care units (ICU) beds, 
M.K. GHANBARI ET AL.
E512
human resources available, medications, and related 
protection items. The country was able to assess IPC-
related capacity to respond to COVID-19 and make rel-
evant decisions.
Private hospitals were prepared to accept referrals if ca-
pacity of public facilities was saturated. Safe recovery 
beds were provided for the patients after discharge so 
that the ICU/critical care units (CCU) beds would be dis-
charged faster, and patients would not spend their recov-
ery period in isolated places contaminating the society.
The plan for monitoring healthcare personnel exposed to 
confirmed COVID-19 cases was initially challenged by 
the shortages of protective equipment in some centers, 
which was resolved by increasing the production capac-
ity of personal protective equipment (PPE). IPC guidance 
was provided to patients, health workers, and the general 
public. However, sanitizers for hand washing and person-
al hygiene could not be provided in high-risk and crowded 
places. Also, regular testing of health care providers and 
hospital staff could not be alaways performed in a timely 
manner to ensure their safety. On the other hand, mental 
health support was provided to the healthcare staff.
Pillar 5: Country‑level coordination, 
planning, and monitoring
One of the challenges in the management of COVID-19 
is bureaucracy and the executive barriers to cross-sec-
toral cooperation. The lack of multidisciplinary teams 
for implementing the necessary coordination to produce 
evidence in the field of IPC, especially in developing 
countries, affects the rapid and successful response to 
the spread of infections and emerging diseases [40, 41].
Prior to the outbreak, the Supreme Council for Health 
and Food Security was the center for inter-sectoral co-
operation and joint activities with health-oriented activi-
ties in Iran. After the first confirmed COVID-19 case in 
Iran, in addition to the council chaired by the President, 
a special council was set up as the “National COVID-19 
Command Center”, which includes the country’s min-
isters. This council has social, economic, educational, 
health, security, and labour support committees. Deci-
sions in this committee, with the leading role of the Min-
istry of Health, are made collectively, and all public and 
private sectors are required to comply with them.
Various departments of the Ministry of Health, including 
those dealing with non-communicable and communicable 
disorders, maternal, neonatal and community health, were 
instructed by the National Headquarters and the Minister 
of Health to prepare and implement programs for high-risk 
populations, including phone tracking of more than 9 mil-
lion people with chronic diseases, preparation of standards 
and nutritional recommendations for healthy indviduals 
as well as patients. Decision to escalate or lift restrictions 
depended on the geographical areas, their epidemiological 
features (hotspots, low versus high prevalence rates) and 
type (commercial, residential, or industrial). 
Pillar 6: Points of entry
The world is facing new, unprecedentd challenges in con-
trolling infectious diseases in the 21st century, since glo-
balization, urbanization and new lifestyles make it easier 
for infections to quickly spread between countries [42]. 
In the first month of the epidemic in Iran, by examining 
the records of patients’ travels, travel restrictons were 
implemented, including limiting or banning intercity 
trips. Active cases surveillance was established at bor-
ders. More than 70 million people have been screened 
electronically and by telephone, and cases have been re-
ported to the WHO. Funeral protocols for deaths from 
COVID-19 or other causes were planned in advance to 
avoid gatherings.
At the beginning of the spread of the disease, 
212,000  people from Iranian airports (Tehran, Rasht, 
and Arak) traveled to international destinations; also, 
several thousand people from other countries entered 
Iran [43]. This contributed to the diffusion of the virus. 
Adopting and implementing stricter rules regarding the 
control of points of entry, especially hotspots or epicent-
ers, was therefore crucial.
Pillar 7: Case management
In the field of case management of infectious diseases, 
ensuring high standard of care and therapeutic interven-
tions to reduce the prevalence and mortality rates is of 
paramount importance  [44]. Currently, the only way to 
deal with COVID-19 is through support, and prevention to 
reduce transmission in society [45]. Recommendations for 
mild cases have been communicated by social media and 
educational materials have been prepared in collaboration 
with the WHO and divulged through medical universities. 
Motorcycle ambulances were very helpful in investigating 
the initial cases in large cities. They were sent to transport 
the persons in need, and at the same time, the person’s fam-
ily received basic training and information about the dis-
ease. According to the principles of the WHO, nutritional 
and activity principles for patients were prepared by the 
Nutrition Improvement Office of the Ministry of Health 
and were implemented in all medical centers. 
Pillar 8: Operational support and logistics
While developed countries have adequate funds to sup-
port and respond to COVID-19 rather than developing 
ones, Iran has also suffered due to sanctions and reduc-
tions in oil price. However, the Supreme Council for 
Health and Food security implemented some necessary 
policies to support vulnerable groups including delayed 
bills such as electricity and bank loan repayments, de-
spite financial constraints [46].
As the number of patients increased, the Minister of 
Health asked to speed up mask production, and in a let-
ter asked the President for a credit of 250 million Eu-
ros  [47]. All religious and non-religious ceremonies, 
celebrations and gatherings, entertainment and sports 
centers were closed. Schools and universities were also 
closed. Efforts were made to provide online courses. 
Hotels and accommodation centers almost did not ac-
cept anymore guests [42]. The military force contributed 
to support the fight against COVID-19, by cleaning up 
public areas from possible sources of the virus and creat-
ing urgent hospital beds.
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Sixty-seven Iranian Universites of Medical Sciences, 
thousands of general practitioners, clinical specialists, 
nurses, and basic medical scientists contributed to the 
support. Using the capacity of donors was very helpful, 
especially at the beginning of the epidemic. Also, NGOs 
mobilized people’s capacity.
Recommendations
Countries should find a balance between disease-related 
and economic policies, in order to mnimize financial 
losses and protect vulnerable groups by providing subsi-
dized protective items (such as masks and disinfectants).
Control of internal borders and restriction of travels 
across inter-provincial borders as well as of internation-
al travels have played a crucial role in controlling the 
spread of the disease. 
The involvement of all relevant stakeholders and the 
technical support of international organizations, includ-
ing the WHO, have given Iran the opportunity to take 
appropriate actions.
Limitations
The present study is a pilot study, devised as a qualita-
tive investigation. More quantitative information should 
be collected. 
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has represented an unprec-
edent event that has challenged healthcare systems and 
facilities worldwide, highlighting their weaknesses 
and the need for inter-sectoral cooperation and collab-
oration during the crisis. Analyzing these experiences 
and capitalizing on them, by strengthening them, will 
help countries to be more prepared to face possible fu-
ture crises. Studies such as those based on the WHO 
framework can identify weaknesses and help research-
ers and policy-makers investigate and address them. 
By determining the current crisis situation, health sys-
tems can increase their capacity for similar crises in 
the future.
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Appendix
The Iran’s health system according to the COVID-19 strategic preparedness and response plan of the WHO.
Tab. A. Country-level coordination, planning, and monitoring.
Yes No Unclear
Activate multi-sectoral, multi-partner coordination mechanisms to support preparedness and 
response
X
Engage with national authorities and key partners to develop a country-specific operational plan 
with estimated resource requirements for COVID‑19 preparedness and response, or preferably 
adapt, where available, an existing Influenza pandemic preparedness plan
X
Conduct initial capacity assessment and risk analysis, including mapping of vulnerable popula-
tions
X
Begin establishing metrics and monitoring and evaluation systems to assess the effectiveness 
and impact of planned measures
X
Establish an incident management team, including rapid deployment of designated staff from 
national and partner organizations, within a public health emergency operation centre (PHEOC) 
or equivalent if available
X
Identify, train, and designate spokespeople X
Engage with local donors and existing programmes to mobilize/allocate resources and capacities 
to implement operational plan
X
Review regulatory requirements and legal basis of all potential public health measures X
Monitor implementation of CPRP based on key performance indicators in SPRP and produce 
regular situation report
X
Conduct regular operational reviews to assess implementation success and epidemiological situ-
ation, and adjust operational plans as necessary
X
Conduct after action reviews in accordance with IHR (2005) as required X
Use COVID‑19 outbreak to test/learn from existing plans, systems and lesson-learning exercises 
to inform future preparedness and response activities
X
Tab. B. Risk communication and community engagement.
Yes No Unclear
Implement national risk-communication and community engagement plan for COVID‑19, includ-
ing details of anticipated public health measures (use the existing procedures for pandemic in-
fluenza if available)
X
Conduct rapid behaviour assessment to understand key target audience, perceptions, concerns, 
influencers and preferred communication channels
X
Prepare local messages and pre-test through a participatory process, specifically targeting key 
stakeholders and at-risk groups
X
Identify trusted community groups (local influencers such as community leaders, religious lead-
ers, health workers, community volunteers) and local networks (women’s groups, youth groups, 
business groups, traditional healers, etc.)
X
Establish and utilize clearance processes for timely dissemination of messages and materials in 
local languages and adopt relevant communication channels
X
Engage with existing public health and community-based networks, media, local NGOs, schools, 
local governments and other sectors such as healthcare service providers, education sector, busi-
ness, travel and food/agriculture sectors using a consistent mechanism of communication
X
Utilize two-way “channels” for community and public information sharing such as hotlines (text 
and talk), responsive social media such as U-Report where available, and radio shows, with sys-
tems to detect and rapidly respond to and counter misinformation
X
Establish large scale community engagement for social and behaviour change approaches to en-
sure preventive community and individual health and hygiene practices in line with the national 
public health containment recommendations
X
Systematically establish community information and feedback mechanisms including through: 
social media monitoring; community perceptions, knowledge, attitude and practice surveys; and 
direct dialogues and consultations
X
Ensure changes to community engagement approaches are based on evidence and needs, and 
ensure all engagement is culturally appropriate and empathetic
X
Document lessons learned to inform future preparedness and response activities X
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Tab. C. Surveillance, rapid response teams, and case investigation.
Yes No Unclear
Disseminate case definition in line with WHO guidance and investigation protocols to healthcare 
workers (public and private sectors)
X
Activate active case finding and event-based surveillance for influenza-like illness (ILI), and severe 
acute respiratory infection (SARI)
X
Assess gaps in active case finding and event-based surveillance systems X
Enhance existing surveillance systems to enable monitoring of COVID‑19 transmission and adapt 
tools and protocols for contact tracing and monitoring to COVID‑19
X
Undertake case-based reporting to WHO within 24 hours under IHR (2005) X
Actively monitor and report disease trends, impacts, population perspective to global laboratory/
epidemiology systems including anonymized clinical data, case fatality ratio, high-risk groups 
(pregnant women, immunocompromised) and children
X
Train and equip rapid-response teams to investigate cases and clusters early in the outbreak, and 
conduct contact tracing within 24 hours
X
Provide robust and timely epidemiological and social science data analysis to continuously inform 
risk assessment and support operational decision making for the response
X
Test the existing system and plan through actual experience and/or table-top or simulation exer-
cises, and document findings to inform future preparedness and response activities
X
Produce weekly epidemiological and social science reports and disseminate to all levels and in-
ternational partners
X
Tab. D. Points of entry.
Yes No Unclear
Develop and implement a points of entry public health emergency plan X
Disseminate latest disease information, standard operating procedures, equip and train staff in 
appropriate actions to manage ill passenger(s)
X
Prepare rapid health assessment/isolation facilities to manage ill passenger(s) and to safely trans-
port them to designated health facilities
X
Communicate information about COVID‑19 to travellers X
Regularly monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of readiness and response measures at points 
of entry, and adjust readiness and response plans as appropriate
X
Tab. E. National laboratories.
Yes No Unclear
Establish access to a designated international COVID‑19 reference laboratory X
Adopt and disseminate standard operating procedures (as part of disease outbreak investigation 
protocols) for specimen collection, management, and transportation for COVID‑19 diagnostic 
testing
X
Identify hazards and perform a biosafety risk assessment at participating laboratories; use ap-
propriate biosafety measures to mitigate risks
X
Adopt standardized systems for molecular testing, supported by assured access to reagents and 
kits
X
Ensure specimen collection, management, and referral network and procedures are functional X
Share genetic sequence data and virus materials according to established protocols for COVID‑19 X
Develop and implement plans to link laboratory data with key epidemiological data for timely 
data analysis
X
Develop and implement surge plans to manage increased demand for testing; consider conser-
vation of lab resources in anticipation of potential widespread COVID‑19 transmission
X
Monitor and evaluate diagnostics, data quality and staff performance, and incorporate findings 
into strategic review of national laboratory plan and share lessons learned
X
Develop a quality assurance mechanism for point-of-care testing, including quality indicators X
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Tab. F. Infection prevention and control.
Yes No Unclear
Assess IPC capacity at all levels of healthcare system, including public, private, traditional practices 
and pharmacies. Minimum requirements include functional triage system and isolation rooms, 
trained staff (for early detection and standard principles for IPC); and sufficient IPC materials, 
including personal protective equipment (PPE) and WASH services/hand hygiene stations
X
Assess IPC capacity in public places and community spaces where risk of communtiy transmission 
is considered high
X
Review and update existing national IPC guidance: health guidance should include defined pa-
tient-referral pathway including an IPC focal point, in collaboration with case management. Com-
munity guidance should include specific recommendations on IPC measures and referral systems 
for public places such as schools, markets and public transport as well as community, household, 
and family practices
X
Develop and implement a plan for monitoring of healthcare personnel exposed to confirmed 
cases of COVID‑19 for respiratory illness
X
Develop a national plan to manage PPE supply (stockpile, distribution) and to identify IPC surge 
capacity (numbers and competence)
X
Engage trained staff with authority and technical expertise to implement IPC activities, prioritiz-
ing based on risk assessment and local care-seeking patterns
X
Record, report, and investigate all cases of healthcare-associated infections X
Disseminate IPC guidance for home and community care providers X
Implement triage, early detection, and infectious-source controls, administrative controls and 
engineering controls; implement visual alerts (educational material in appropriate language) for 
family members and patients to inform triage personnel of respiratory symptoms and to practice 
respiratory etiquette
X
Support access to water and sanitation for health (WASH) services in public places and community 
spaces most at risk
X
Monitor IPC and WASH implementation in selected healthcare facilities and public spaces using 
the Infection Prevention and Control Assessment Framework, the Hand Hygiene Self-Assessment 
Framework, hand hygiene compliance observation tools, and the WASH Facilities Improvement 
Tool
X
Provide prioritized tailored support to health facilities based on IPC risk assessment and local 
care-seeking patterns, including for supplies, human resources, training
X
Carry out training to address any skills and performance deficits X
Tab. G. Case management.
Yes No Unclear
Map vulnerable populations and public and private health facilities (including traditional healers, phar-
macies and other providers) and identify alternative facilities that may be used to provide treatment
X
Identify Intensive Care Unit capacity X
Continuously assess burden on local health system, and capacity to safely deliver primary health-
care services
X
Ensure that guidance is made available for the self-care of patients with mild COVID-19 symp-
toms, including guidance on when referral to healthcare facilities is recommended
X
Disseminate regularly updated information, train, and refresh medical/ambulatory teams in the 
management of severe acute respiratory infections and COVID-19-specific protocols based on 
international standards and WHO clinical guidance; set up triage and screening areas at all health-
care facilities
X
Establish dedicated and equipped teams and ambulances to transport suspected and confirmed 
cases, and referral mechanisms for severe cases with co morbidity
X
Ensure comprehensive medical, nutritional, and psycho-social care for those with COVID-19 X
Participate in clinical expert network to aid in the clinical characterization of COVID-19 infection, ad-
dress challenges in clinical care, and foster global collaboration (optional based on country capacity)
X
Prepare to assess diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for compassionate use, clinical trials, 
regulatory approval, market authorization, and/or post-market surveillance, as appropriate
X
Adopt international R&D blueprint guidance and WHO protocols for special studies (companionate 
use, Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Investigational Interventions) to investigate ad-
ditional epidemiological, virologic, and clinical characteristics; designate a clinical trial or study sponsor
X
Evaluate implementation and effectiveness of case management procedures and protocols (in-
cluding for pregnant women, children, immunocompromised), and adjust guidance and/or ad-
dress implementation gaps as necessary
X
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Tab. H. Operational support and logistics.
Yes No Unclear
Map available resources and supply systems in health and other sectors; conduct in-country in-
ventory review of supplies based on WHO’s a) Disease Commodity Package (DCP) and b) COVID‑19 
patient kit, and develop a central stock reserve for COVID‑19 case management
X
Review supply chain control and management system (stockpiling, storage, security, transporta-
tion and distribution arrangements) for medical and other essential supplies, including COVID‑19 
DCP and patient kit reserve in-country
X
Review procurement processes (including importation and customs) for medical and other es-
sential supplies, and encourage local sourcing to ensure sustainbility
X
Assess the capacity of local market to meet increased demand for medical and other essential 
supplies, and coordinate international request of supplies through regional and global procure-
ment mechanisms
X
Prepare staff surge capacity and deployment mechanisms; health advisories (guidelines and 
SOPs); pre- and post-deployment package (briefings, recommended/mandatory vaccinations, 
enhanced medical travel kits, psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support 
groups) to ensure staff well-being
X
